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I. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this case, Prepaid Dental Services, Inc., Appellant 
herein, petitioned the court below for a Declaratory Judgment 
declaring that the Findings and Order of Roger c. Day, 
Commissioner of Insurance of the State of Utah, herein 
Respondent, were inconsistent with the definition of 
"Insurance" set forth in Section 31-1-7 of t~e Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) and the definition of a "Health Maintenance 
Organization" within the provisions of Title 31, Chapter 42, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
II. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
The court below issued a Memorandum Opinion which 
sustained the Findings and Order of the Insurance Department 
and dismissed Appellant's Petition. 
III. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the decision by the 
lower court which sustained the Findings and Order of the 
Insurance Commissioner, together with a Declaration by the 
court that the Appellant's proposed plan constitutes neither 
Insurance within the meaning of Utah Code Annotated Section 
31-1-7 or a Health Maintenance Organization within the meaning 
of Title 31, Chapter 42 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
-5-
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant and Respondent have stipulated to the 
following facts: 
1. Appellant is a Utah corporation in good standing. 
2. Respondent is the Commissioner of Insurance of the 
State of Utah. 
3. The Respondent issued Findings and Order dated August 
8, 1979, regarding the proposed operations of Appellant stating 
in effect that the plan proposed by Appellant constitutes 
"insurance" within the definition set forth in Section 31-1-7, 
Utah Code Annotated (1953), and that the proposed operations of 
Appellant also fall within the definition of a nHealth, 
Maintenance Organizationn within the provisions of Title 31, 
Chapter 42, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
4. Appellant has not commenced to do business within the 
State of Utah. 
5. The business operations which Appellant desires to 
carry on within the State of Utah are as follows: 
a. Appellant would contract with employers to 
arrange for specific dental services to be provided to the 
employer's employee·s (hereinafter "Participantsn) on a prepaid 
basis. 
b. Appellant would contract with dentists licensed 
to practice dentistry in Utah to perform the specific dental 
services listed in the Dental Group Agreement, annexed hereto 
-6-
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as Exhibit "A", at no charge to the Participants other than the 
fixed monthly charge set forth in the Dental Group Agreement. 
c. The Dental Health Care Plan would operate on a 
system where the Participants would be required to have the 
Available Dental Services and Co-Payment Services provided by 
Specific Dentists rather than by a dentist chosen by the 
Participant. 
d. The documents attached hereto as Exhibits "A", 
"B" and "C", and entitled, respectively, "Dental Group 
Agreement", "Employer Group Agreement" and "Master Contract", 
are the legal documents that would govern the operation of 
Appellant's dental health care plan and set forth the rights 
and obligations of the parti~s involved. [Copies of Exhibits 
"A", "B", an_d "C" are found in the record at page 73, 90, 93, 
respectively.] 
6. Appellant does not provide "basic health care 
services" as defined under Section 31-42-3(6), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). Under this definition the organization is 
required to provide as a minimum, emergency care, in-patient 
hospital and physician care, out-patient medical services, and 
out-of-area coverage. 
7. According to the Order issued by Respondent, Appellant 
is enjoined from operating its proposed dental health care plan 
without a Certificate of Authority from the Utah Insurance 
Department and would have to expand its proposed services 
offered to include "basic health care services" as defined 
-7-
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in the proceeding paragraphs to be eligible to qualify for 
licensing as a Health Maintenance Organization. 
The court, after receiving memoranda from both 
Appellant and Respondent and after hearing the argument of 
counsel, issued its Memorandum Opinion without taking 
additional evidence. The court below sustained the Findings 
and Order of the Respondent and held that the substance of the 
transaction proposed by Appellant is an insurance transaction 
and is thereby covered by Title 31 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
Specifically, the court found that there was both a distribution 
of risk and assumption of that risk under the Dental Group 
Agreement and the performance bond, holding that "Participants 
are third party beneficiaries of that contract." 
It is Appellant's contention as set out below that the 
Finding by the court that there is an assumption of the risk by 
Prepaid Dental Services, Inc. is without foundation in the 
evidence and is, as a matter of law, erroneous. It is further 
Appellant's contention that Appellant's proposed plan does not 
subject it to regulation as a Health Maintenance Organization 
or in any other way subject it to regulation under the 
Insurance Code of the State of Utah. As such, Appellant 
respectfully requests the court for an Order reversing the 
trial court's determination that Appellant's proposed plan 
constitutes "Insurance", together with an Order allowing 
Appellant to conduct business, without further interference 
from Respondent. 
-8-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAN PROPOSED BY PDS IS NOT INSURANCE 
Section 31-1-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953) defines 
"insurance" as follows: 
Insurance is a contract whereby one 
undertakes to indemnify another or pay 
or allow a specified or ascertainable 
_amount or benefit upon determinable 
risk contingencies. 
Justice Crockett, in his concurring opinion in In Re 
Clark's Estate, 10 Utah 2d 427, 354 P.2d 112 {1960), and which 
opinion was expressly approved of and adopted by the court in 
Utah Funeral Directors and Embalmers Association v. Memorial 
Gardens of the Valley, 17 Utah 2d 227, 408 P.2d 190 {1965), set 
forth the basic elements of a contract of insurance: 
"Insurance" is an agreement that, for a 
premium it receives, the insurer will 
pay to a beneficiary a stated sum upon 
the happening of a contingency such as 
death, or other loss. It involves risk 
on the part of the insurer to pay on 
the happening of the contingency and a 
spreading of the risk over the group 
who pay the premiums. Or, as sometimes 
stated, insurance involves risk-
shifting and risk-distributing. Id. at 
119. 
Central to the concept of insurance is indemnification, or 
assumption of the risk by the insurer, or as stated by Justice 
Crockett in "risk-shifting" from the insured to the insurer. 
-9-
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Relevant case law from other jurisdictions concures in 
this concept and holds that even where there is a distribution 
of the risk over a larger group but no assumption of that risk 
by a party, that party is not an insurer. Thus the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Jordan 
v. Group Health Association, 107 F. 2d 239 (1939), a case with 
facts very similar to those in the present case, stated: 
Whether the contract is one of 
insurance or of indemnity there must be 
a risk of loss to which one party may 
be subjected by contingent or future 
events and an assumption of it by 
legally binding arrangement by 
another. Even the most loosely stated 
concepts of insurance and indemnity 
require these elements. Hazard is 
essential and equally so a shifting of 
its incidence. If there is no risk, or 
there being one it is not shifted to 
another or others, there can be neither 
insurance nor indemnity. Insurance 
also, by the better view, involves a 
distribution of the risk, but 
distribution without assumPtion hardly 
can be held to be insurance. These are 
elemental concepts and controlling 
~· Id. at 245 (emphasis added) 
Assumption of the risk from the insured to the insurer is a 
critical factor that must be present before a contract can be 
deemed to be "insurance". 
Under the plan proposed by PDS there is a risk. That 
risk is that any individual Participant will have need of the 
specific dental services enumerated in the Dental Group 
Agreement. It can be argued that there is a distribution of 
this risk among the several Participants who share the same 
risk~ however, a more accurate description would be the joining 
-10-
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together of a number of persons who will need dental care in 
order to obtain a discount price for such dental care. But 
assuming, arguendo, that there is a distribution of risk under 
the Prepaid Dental Plan, the basic insurance equation fails in 
that PDS does not assume that risk. 
Section 2.02 of the Master Contract, Record P. 99, 
clearly states that PDS' obligation to the Participant is not 
to indemnify him for any dental loss he might suffer, but to 
"use its best efforts to obtain the services of qualified, 
licensed professionals and their staffs to provide and perform 
the applicable available dental services to eligible 
participants." Once PDS has used its best efforts to arrange 
for the specific dental services to be performed, it has 
fulfulled its contractual obligation to the Participant. Under 
Section 5.03 of the Master Contract, Record P. 106-107, if PDS 
is unable, by using its best efforts, to obtain the services of 
professionals and their staffs to render the specified dental 
services to the Employer Group for a period of 30 days after 
the date upon which such services first became unavailable, the 
contract between PDS and the Employer Group terminates without 
further obligation of any of the parties to the other. 
A simple way to demonstrate the absence of an 
assumption of the risk by PDS is to examine the hypothetical 
situation under PDS' plan in which PDS has arranged for a 
Dental Group to perform the dental services, but the 
Participant is unable to obtain the dental services from the 
-11-
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Dental Group, and PDS, after using its best efferts is unable 
to arrange for a substitute Dental Group to provide the 
services for a period exceeding 30 days. If, in this 
situation, the Partcipant could hold PDS liable, then there 
would have been an assumption of the risk by PDS. Clearly this 
is not the case, as PDS would be liable to the participant only 
if it had failed to use its best efforts to arrange for a 
Dental Group to provide the services. 
Not only does PDS not assume the risk but neither has 
the Dental Group assumed the risk. Under the provisions of 
Article XII of the Dental Group Agreement, Record P. 79, 
between PDS and the Dental Group, the Dental Group must provide 
a performance bond in an amount equal to the estimated annual 
payment due from each Employer Group. The terms of such 
performance bond provide that in the event the Dental Group 
fails for any reason to perform the required services the 
bonding company will pay such other licensed dentist as may be 
designated by the Participant to perform the specific dental 
services described in the Dental Group Agreement. Thus, if the 
Dental Group failed for any reason to perform any of the 
specified dental services the Participant would rely on the 
performance bond to have those services performed by another 
dentist of his choice. 
The bond which is required of the Dental Group is not, 
as suggested in the court's opinion below, a factor which lends 
weight to the proposition that PDS' plan is one of insurance. 
-12-
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Rather, the insurance company or other entity which issues the 
performance bond to the Dental Group, insuring the Dental 
Group's performance is already licensed and regulated. The 
risk is assumed by the Dental Group's performance bond not by 
PDS. 
It is noted that the services provided by PDS are offered 
only to select employer groups and not the public at large. 
There is considerably more protection in a program only offered 
to employee groups who are better able to determine the 
adequacey of the plan than might an individual member of the 
public. 
Clearly PDS' contractual obligation to "use its best 
efforts" to obtain licensed professionals to perform the dental 
services does not make it an insurer under the Utah statute. 
Section 31-1-7, Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides, in 
pertinent part: 
Insurance is a contract whereby one 
undertakes to •.• allow a ••• benefit upon 
determinable risk contingencies. 
PDS' use of "best efforts" is not a benefit it undertakes to 
allow upon determinable risk contingencies. It is a 
contractual obligation which PDS undertakes to perform whether 
or not the Participant ever has need of any of the dental 
services. PDS' obligation to arrange for dental groups to 
provide dental services is the same whether any one participant 
ever has need for the dental services. PDS' obligation is a 
contractual obligation that is in no way based upon a 
possibility that any one participant or group of participants 
-13-
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could have a serious dental problem above and beyond the 
routine servies PDS has arranged for. In any event PDS is not 
liable to perform the services or pay for them if they are not 
performed. Thus PDS' obligations are not based upon 
"determinable risk contingencies." 
To hold under these Facts that the contractual 
obligation to use one's best efforts was contemplated under the 
Utah insurance statute would be to, potentially, transform all 
service contracts, and indeed all contracts, into insurance 
contracts. By way of example, a law firm which works on a 
retainer basis has never been considered to be an insurer that 
all the demands made by the retainer will be met or that they 
will be met timely. However~ as PDS has contracted to use its 
best efforts to arrange for dental services on a prepaid basis, 
so the law firm may contract to use its best efforts to provide 
legal services on a prepaid basis. Neither is a gua~antor or 
an insurer. Best efforts is all professionals can deliver. 
In his Findings and Order issued August 8, 1979, the 
Commissioner found that if PDS' obligation to use its "best 
efforts" was not an assumption of the risk, it would be a 
meaningless consideration and the proposed plan could be a 
fraud. Addressing this issue, the court in Jordan, supra, 
stated: 
Group Health assumes no liability, if 
for any reason it becomes unable to 
procure any or all such services when 
called upon to do so, or to indemnify 
-14-
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the member for failure of the physician 
to keep his arrangement or perform it 
properly, and its only obligation in 
such a case is "to use its best efforts 
to procure the needed services from 
another source •••• " 
Tenuous the obligation may be, but that 
does not render it illegal, or make it 
a contract of insurance or one of 
indemnity. Correlatively tenuous is 
the member's responsibility to Group 
Health. Id. at 244 (emphasis is the 
courts). 
Under a best efforts contract, PDS has real and 
substantial obligations, which are not illusory nor are they, 
on the other hand, an assumption of the risk of providing the 
enumerated dental services for the Participants. In Blore v. 
Falstaff Brewing Corporation, 454 F.Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), 
the court had occasion to construe a best efforts contract. 
The court stated that "' [blest efforts' is a term which 
necessarily takes its meaning from circumstances" and that the 
"parties' capability" who contracted to use its best efforts 
must be determined to see if it fulfilled its contractual 
obligation under the contract The court concluded that the 
best efforts contract obligated the promissor to act "in good 
faith and to the extent of its own total capabilities •••• " 
Id • at 267. 
In Group Health Association v. Sheppard, 37 A.2d 749 
(Mun. Ct. of App. for D.C. 1944), the court held that 
"inability is far different than refusal" in declaring that the 
Group Health Association would not be liable "for a mere 
inability to prefect the member" under a best efforts 
obligation. 
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Blore v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation, supra, and 
Group Health clearly demonstrate the parameters of the 
oglibation PDS has taken upon itself when it contracted to "use 
its best efforts" to obtain licensed professionals to perform 
the dental services mentioned in the contracts. Best efforts 
is not an illusory obligation but extends to the total 
capabilities of PDS. Clearly, this is a valid consideration to 
support a contract. It is also clearly not the obligation to 
procure the services in the event it is unable after using its 
best efforts to obtain those services. In the event it is 
unable to procure the described dental services for the 
Participants after having used its best efforts, PDS has no 
further obligation to Participant. PDS would, as in Group 
Health, be liable to a Participant in the event it refused or 
failed to use its best efforts. However, as the court stated 
in Group Health, an "inability is far different than refusal." 
It is also far different from the duty to procure services 
under any circumstances as has been claimed by Respondent. 
What PDS offers to the Participant is a contract for 
services rather than a contract for insurance. A prepaid 
services plan identical in all material respects to that 
proposed by PDS was held not to be insurance in Fishback v. 
Universal Service Agency, 151 P. 768 (Wash. 1915), the court 
finding that: 
••• [I l t seems to be wanting in the 
principal essential necessary to make 
it an insurance contract. Clearly 
there is no hazard or peril whereby the 
-16-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
purchasers of these contracts may 
suffer loss or injury, which the 
respondent insures against. It does 
not guarantee that any of the 
contracting parties, even the 
physician, will perform the services 
agreed upon. On the contrary, in the 
paragraph lettered "V" of its offer of 
benefits it expressly declares that it 
"assumes no liability for the breach of 
any one or all of such contracts." It 
is true that it does say in the same 
paragraph that in the event of a breach 
of the agreement by the dealers or 
physician it will use its best efforts 
to procure other persons or firms to 
offer the same or a similar service. 
But this, while it may require the 
respondent to use reasonable diligence 
to procure another person to perform 
the services in case the contracting 
party for any reason fails therein, and 
may render it liable to the contract 
holder in damages if it should fail to 
exercise such diligence, it is in no 
sense a guarantor or an insurer that 
the service will be performed. There 
is therefore, as we see it, no hazard 
or peril insured against, and, the 
transaction being lacking in this 
essential element, it is not an 
engaging in the insurance business. Id. 
at 772. (Emphasis added.) 
Virtually every other case which has dealt with 
prepaid services organizations has held that such plans do not 
constitute insurance. See Jordan v. Group Health Association, 
supra1 California Physicians' Service v. Garrison, 172 P.2d 4 
(Cal. 1946)1 and, Barmeier v. Oregon Physicians' Service, 243 
P.2d 1053 (Ore. 1952). Likewise the Attorneys General of both 
New Mexico and Arizona have recently issued opinion letters 
finding plans identical to that of PDS not to be insurance 
Based upon the absence of an assumption of the risk by the 
-17-
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prepaid dental service company, the Arizona Attorney General 
found that: 
The majority of cases dealing with the 
subject of prepaid health plans hold 
that a corporation, whether or not 
organized for profit, the object of 
which is to provide members of a group 
with health care services, is not 
engaged in the insurance business. 
See, ~, Jordan v. Group Health 
ASS'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939). 
Both of the plans that you have 
submitted to us provide for the 
rendering of dental services to the 
members of the plans. They do not 
purport to indemnify anyone against 
risk of loss or expense growing out of 
occurrences requiring dental care. 
Accordingly, neither plan constitues 
insurance. 
These opinion letters are included in the Record at pages 192 
and 193 respectively. 
Indeed, in addressing the issue of whether or not the 
plan proposed by PDS is "insurance" and in attempting to 
justify his conclusion that it is, Special Assistant to the 
Utah Attorney General William Gibbs stated in his opinion 
letter to the Commissioner of Insurance that he was "aware that 
this position is contrary to that which has been taken in 
Arizona, New Mexico, California and Washington" based on the 
same fact situation, record p. 197. Assumption of the risk is 
still a vital part of Utah's statute no matter how broad or 
narrow it may be. 
The fact that there may be an assumption of the risk 
by the Dental Group when they obtain a performance bond does 
-18-
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not melt the Dental Group into PDS. They are seperate, 
distinct organizations who have contracted with one another at 
arms length. The District Court suggests they are one and 
refers to the transaction as if the court were piercing a 
corporate veil. The relationship between PDS (Administrators) 
and the dental group (Dentists) is that of independent 
contractors not as principal and agent. The District Court 
erred in holding that the contractual duties of one was the 
contractual duty of the other. 
This is clearly a proper and inexpensive way to 
deliver a limited dental service. 
POINT II 
PDS IS NOT A HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION 
UNDER THE UTAH CODE 
The District Court did not address the issue of 
whether or not PDS was a HMO. The District Court affirmed that 
part of the Commissioner's order without comment. It is thus 
our intent to state the reasons we do not believe that a 
company that only offers dental benefits can be regulated under 
a statute that requires all within its reach to offer 
comprehensive medical, surgical, hospital benefits. Simply 
stated, did the legislature intend to regulate only full 
service HMO's; or, did they not intend to include single 
service organizations. It is a matter of statutory 
construction. 
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In his Findings and Order issued August 8, 1979, 
Exhibit "A", the Commissioner found that the plan proposed by 
PDS qualified it as a "Health Maintenance Organization" under 
the provisions of Title 31, Chapter 42, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) (hereinafter "the Utah HMO Act"). 
Section 31-42-3(4) of the Utah HMO Act defines "Health 
Maintenance Organization" as follows: 
Any person ••• who furnishes, either 
directly or through arrangements with 
others, health care to an enrolled 
member in return for periodic payments; 
the amounts of said payments are agreed 
upon prior to the time during which the 
health care may be furnished; and who 
is obligated to the member to arrange 
for or to directly provide available 
and accessable health care. 
The declaration of public policy contained in Section 
31-42-2 of the Utah HMO Act, and given as a guide to the 
interpretation thereof, demonstrates that the Act was passed to 
(1) allow the State to make sure that organizations purporting 
to provide comprehensive health care are able to deliver the 
wide range of benefits which they offer; (2) to remove the 
"legal barrier" that HealtK care companies are not insurance1 
and, (3) thus, to allow the state through the Department of 
Insurance to regulate these organizations: 
The legislature wishes to eliminate 
legal barriers to the establishment of 
health maintenance organizations which 
provide readily available accessible 
and quality comprehensive health care 
to their members and to encourage their 
development as an alternative method of 
health care delivery. The State of 
Utah must have reasonable assurance 
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that health maintenance organizations 
offering health plans within this state 
are financially and administratively 
sound and that such organizations are 
in fact able to deliver the benefits 
which they offer. (Emphasis added). 
While it is true that the statutes of this state "are 
to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of 
the statutes and to promote justice," Section 68-3-2, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), it is also the law of this state that "it is 
equally true that they should not be distorted beyond the 
intent of the legislature." Stanton Transportation Company v. 
Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P.2d 207 (1959). See also Eccles 
Lumber Company v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713 (1906). 
The intent of the Utah Legislature in enacting the 
Utah HMO Act is clearly set forth within the Act itself: "to 
eliminate legal barriers to the establishment of health 
maintenance organizations which provide readily available 
accessible and quality comprehensive health care," and to 
enable the state to make sure "that such organizations are in 
fact able to deliver the benefits which they offer." Section 
31-42-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953). To interpret this Act as 
intending to prohibit the operation of single service health 
organizations, such as PDS, would distort the act well beyond 
the intent of the legislature. 
One of the chief reasons that the state desired to 
regulate comprehensive health care providers was that these 
Health care policies were being offered to the general public. 
In the instant case, PDS would only offer its plan to select 
employer groups. 
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Because PDS would offer its plan only to select Employer 
groups, there is not the same public need to be served by 
regulating PDS as there would be if the plan were offered to 
the general public. 
The legislature dealt only with the regulating of 
comprehensive health care providers and, for whatever reason, 
did not undertake to regulate single service health 
organizations. In Point IV of his Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities to the court below, the Respondent conceded that 
the Utah Legislature did not intend to regulate single service 
health organizations under the Utah Health Maintenance 
Organization Act: 
It is true, as PDS claims, that the legislature did 
not intend to regulate single service corporations 
under the Health Maintenance Organization Act. 
Respondent's Brief, page 14, Record at page 213. 
The Respondent has argued in the court below that 
because single service health organizations are not 
specifically allowed under the terms of the Utah Health 
Maintenance Organization Act, they are therefore prohibited. 
The proper rule of statutory construction is to the contrary. 
In Hansen v. Board of Education, 116 P.2d 936 (Utah 1941) the 
court stated at 940: 
"It is a well established rule of construction that 
where a statute grants a power or right the powers not 
mentioned in the enumeration are intended to be 
excluded." 
The legislature has granted the Commissioner the right to 
regulate comprehensive health care provides under the Utah HMO 
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act, not single service organizations such as PDS. As the Utah 
Legislature has not undertaken to regulate single service 
health corporations such as PDS, any such regulation should 
await further legislative action unless it can be demonstrated 
that the proposed plan for a single service health organization 
is regulated by some other statute. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commissioner of Insurance has found that PDS would 
be both an insurer and an Health Maintenance Organization if it 
operated its proposed prepaid dental service plan in Utah. In 
reality it would be neither. 
PDS would not be an insurer under Utah statutory and 
case law in that it would neither indemnify the Participant nor 
would it undertake to allow a benefit upon determinable risk 
contingencies. In short, there would not be a shifting of the 
risk from the Participant to PDS or any other party. Thus the 
plan is not insurance. To hold otherwise would be to depart 
from all accepted definitions of insurance and substantially 
broaden the Utah s~atutory definition thereof. 
PDS is not to be subject to the provisions of the Utah 
HMO Act as it is a single service health organization and not 
an organization purporting to offer a comprehensive health care 
plan to the public. 
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For these reasons Petitioner contends that 
Respondent's interpretation of Section 31-1-7 and Title 31, 
Chapter 42, Utah Code Annotated (1953) with respect to 
Petitioner's proposed plan is incorrect and respectfully 
requests that the Court issue an appropriate order and judgment 
determining PDS to be neither an insurer nor a Health 
Maintenance Organization under Utah Law, and order the State 
Insurance Commissioner to desist from interfering with the 
operation of PDS. 
71': 
DATED thi~/5-aay of February, 1980. 
SENIOR & SENIOR 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two co~s of the foregoing 
APPELLANTS BRIEF were mailed this /.,?- _. day of February, 1980, 
to William G. Gibbs Attorney for Respondent at 351 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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